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The Arab Spring or Arab awakening refers to a series of protests and demonstrations throughout the 
Arab Word that either brought about the exit from power of long-time autocrats, as in Tunisia, Libya 
and Egypt, or mobilized popular opposition to regimes, as witnessed in Jordan and Bahrain. It also led 
to pro-democratic stirrings, albeit to a lesser extent, in East Asia, such as the popular movement which 
took place under the Jasmine revolution label in China. These uprisings raise many questions of both 
political and legal nature including whether people and movements in the Arab World and China 
strive for democracy? If so, does the Chinese Jasmine revolution call for the same kind of democracy 
as the Arab Spring? And if yes, is this conception of democracy identical to the Western conception of 
democracy? 
To grapple with this set of questions, I will start by outlining the classical theoretical 
framework on the meaning of democracy. The definitional debate took place both in political science 
and international law. Next, I examine whether scholars and the international community accept that 
there exists one sole definition of democracy applicable and relevant to all regions or whether there 
exists a variety of different definitions that are regionally distinct. Finally, I compare the demands to 
the definition(s) of democracy in order to provide a framework for thinking about democracy and 
democratic demands elucidated in the forthcoming chapters. 
Democracy in Political Science: A Centuries-Old, Essentially Contested Concept 
The concept of democracy has been the subject of fierce discussion during the course of several 
centuries. The discussion can be traced back to ancient Greece. Etymologically, the word is derived 
from the Greek ‘δημος’ and ‘κρατειν’ meaning respectively ‘people’ and ‘power’. In political science 
in general, the discussion of democracy deals with the organization of a state and the exercise of 
power. The scope of the discussion is however very broad. The main issues that are discussed are the 
meaning of democracy, the sources or preconditions of democracy (Lipset, 1960; Huntington, 1993), 
the various forms of democracy (Dahl, 2005) and any consequences a democracy might generate 
(Kant, 1970). 
Contrary to other political theories, such as for instance communism, democracy does not 
have a(ny) founding father(s). Consequently, democracy’s scope and meaning has not been developed 
by a limited number of people during a limited period of time. Throughout its long history, the concept 
has had several different meanings, some of which would be considered contrary to today’s 
interpretation (Crick, 2002; Dahl, Shapiro and Cheibub, 2003). Its current meaning is the result of a 
several centuries long evolution (Graham, 2006). 
In current political discourse, there does not exist agreement on one particular definition of 
democracy (Dahl, Shapiro and Cheibub, 2003). All core concepts in political science, including 
democracy, are considered to be essentially contested concepts meaning that all elements used to 
define them are contested themselves (Devos, 2011). Given that so many different views exist, it is 
accepted that there will never exist a consensus on one particular definition (Devos, 2011). 
Consequently, many different views exist on how democracy should be defined and thus, on its 
meaning. Both the merits and possible flaws of the various theories have been acknowledged and well 
documented. The three most dominant views in political discourse with regard to the meaning of 
democracy are the procedural approach, the substantive and the deliberative approach (Dahl, Shapiro 
and Cheibub 2003; Marsh and Stoker, 2010; Devos, 2011). It should, however, be acknowledged that 
many theories cannot be easily divided into one of these three approaches. Many conceptions fall 
somewhere in between. A comprehensive account of all the different conceptions of democracy would 
lead us too far and therefore is not intended here. The following section will only briefly discuss the 
arguments set out by the most influential proponents of the three main theories. 
Proponents of the procedural view emphasize practices and institutions that characterize 
democratic regimes, without specifying any outcome these regimes are supposed to bring about and 
without paying much attention to how preferences are formed. Influential proponents of such a 
minimalist conception are Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) and Adam Przeworski (born 1940). 
Schumpeter justifies his choice for a procedural view by identifying what he considers to be 
flaws in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s interpretation of the social contract, who in turn was influenced by 
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), generally considered to be the founding father of contractarianism 
(Cudd, 2008; Hobbes, 1950). Contractarianists argued against the idea that monarchs were divinely 
empowered to legislate (Hobbes, 1950). Variations of Hobbes’ contract theory can be found in the 
writings of John Locke (1632–1704), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–
1778), John Rawls (1921–2002) and David Gauthier (born 1932). The discussion of the differences 
between these theories falls outside the scope of this contribution. However, Rousseau’s suggestion 
will be briefly outlined as it constitutes the starting point for Schumpeter’s procedural view. 
Rousseau argues that when people reach the point where the obstacles to their preservation in 
the state of nature prove greater than each individual’s strength to preserve oneself in that state, the 
human race will perish if it does not change its mode of existence (1822, p. 21). Rousseau considers 
the only way for people to preserve themselves to be the union of their separate powers in a manner 
that they are strong enough to overcome any resistance and so that their powers are directed by a 
single motive and act in concert. He belies the social contract to be the perfect form of association 
which will defend the person and goods of each other with the collective force of all, and under which 
each individual, while uniting oneself with the others, obeys no one but oneself, and remains as free as 
before (1822, pp. 22–4). Thus, each person puts into the community his person and all his powers 
under the supreme direction of the general will (la volonté générale i.e. the public interest). Whoever 
refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body (i.e. the other members 
of the community) (1822, p. 31). 
Schumpeter rephrases Rousseau’s suggestion into following definition: the democratic method 
is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by 
making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order 
to carry out its will (Schumpeter, 1959). Schumpeter rejects this approach to democracy mainly for the 
reason that it assumes that ‘the people’ hold a definite and rational opinion over every individual 
question and that they give effect to this opinion by choosing representatives who will see to it that 
that opinion is carried out (1959, p. 269). Therefore, he defines the democratic method as that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. Schumpeter’s minimalist definition of 
democracy has proven very influential as it has been embraced by many other political scholars 
(Huntington, 1993; Lipset, 1960; Linz and Stepan, 1978; Powell, 1982; Vanhanen, 1990; Palma, 1991; 
Przeworski, 1999) 
Adam Przeworski defended Schumpeter’s minimalist approach but on other grounds 
(Przeworski, 1999). Similar to Schumpeter, he renounces the eighteenth-century theories for being 
‘consensualist’. He accepts two assumptions namely, one, that there are conflicts of values and interest 
in any society and, two, that people want to resolve these conflicts peacefully. Based on these 
assumptions he argues that the mere possibility of being able to change governments can avoid 
violence and secondly that being able to do so by voting has consequences on its own. First, the very 
prospect that governments may change can result in a peaceful regulation of conflicts. He 
distinguishes between two groups of people the ‘winners’ i.e. the incumbent government and the 
‘losers’ i.e. the ones currently not in power. He argues that the incumbent rulers behave well in office 
due to electoral incentives i.e. the desire to be re-elected and because of the realization that should they 
lose the next elections they are in the same position as the losers are now. The losers accept the 
outcome of elections if they have a sufficient chance to win and a sufficiently large payoff in future 
elections. He refers to this situation as a ‘self-enforcing equilibrium’. Secondly, Przeworski believes 
that voting induces compliance. Voting reveals information about passions, values, and interest and as 
such they inform the losers. Even if voting does not reveal a unique collective will, it does indicate 
limits to rule. He writes ‘the miracle of democracy is that conflicting political forces obey the results 




The second view is the substantive view. Advocates of this view see procedures as necessary 
but insufficient to bring about democratic results. Influential proponents of the latter view include 
Larry Diamond who defends the idea of a liberal democracy (Diamond, 1999), Carole Pateman 
                                                 
1 He does not believe that participation induces compliance.  
arguing in favour of participative democracy (Pateman, 1970) and Robert Dahl who introduces the 
concept of polyarchal democracy (Dahl, 1956). The minimalist Schumpeterian conception of 
democracy has been criticized by other scholars as well (Karl, 1995; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; 
Diamond, 1999). 
Carole Pateman calls for the re-appraisal of the early writings on democratic theory by 
defending the theory of participatory democracy (Pateman, 1970). The theory of participatory 
democracy is built round the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be 
considered in isolation from one another. The existence of representative institutions at national level 
is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at that level socialization 
or ‘social training’, for democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary 
individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed. 
Dahl stresses the need for realism as the modern world is not a world comprising perfect 
democracies, in which all citizens have roughly enough equal political resources and in which 
government is completely responsive to all citizens. Therefore, he introduces the concept polyarchy to 
characterize the more limited form of democracy that has been attained today. He defines democracy 
as a state of affairs constituting a limit and all actions approaching the limit are labelled maximizing 
actions. He offers a list of eight defining characteristics of a democracy, all being institutional 
arrangements focusing on the electoral process. The more one possesses these characteristic the more 
democratic one is, recognizing that democracy is a theoretical utopia which can never be fully reached. 
He thus argues that the democratic relationship is one of a number of social control techniques that in 
fact co-exist in modern democratic polities and that this diversity must be taken into account in a 
modern theory of democracy. 
In addition to the procedural and the substantive view, there is a third view i.e. the deliberative 
view. Adherents of the deliberative view question preferences between the procedural and the 
substantive view, arguing that appropriately deliberative procedures transform them into felicitous 
ways for democracy. For instance, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson defend deliberative 
democracy, being a form of democracy in which deliberation is essential to decision-making. The core 
idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally they should continue to reason 
together to reach mutually acceptable decisions (Gutmann and Thompson, 2000). In their minds, 
deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to solve their moral disagreements 
not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is 
not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue 
our common ends. In the ‘Voice of the People’, James Fiskhin demonstrates the viability of a different 
form of opinion polling and thus, in his mind, a different form of democracy (Fishkin, 2003). He 
admits that implementation of his idea is not inconceivable, but unlikely. However, the image helps to 
clarify an ideal, i.e. a picture of the reconstructed role of citizen (2003, p. 28). 
In addition to the above outlined dichotomy between ‘thin’ or ‘minimalist’ and ‘thick’ of 
‘substantive’ conceptions, the search for a definition is also complicated by the fact that there exist 
disagreement on whether democracy is a question ‘of kind’ or one ‘of degree’ (Sartori, 1987). The 
former interpretation is a binary one, i.e. a political system is either a democracy or not. The latter, in 
contrast, is gradual i.e. democracy is a question of degree (Petersen 2008) The lack of consensus on 
this issue is clearly visible if one compares, for instance, the writings of Joseph Schumpeter to the 
argumentation of Robert Dahl. Whereas the former labels a country democratic if free and fair 
elections are organized, the latter considers democracy to be an ideal which can never be fully 
realized. He believes that what we call democracies only possess ‘a certain level of democracy’. While 
Schumpeter’s and Dahl’s conception may appear to be mutually exclusive, they do not have to be. 
Some authors adhere to both. For instance, Adam Przeworski argues that the struggle for democracy 
always takes place on two fronts: against the authoritarian regime for democracy and against one’s 
allies for the best place under democracy (1991, pp. 51–2). Analogous, Petersen argues that 
democracy has two dimensions: a binary one, which differentiates between democracies and non-
democracies and a graduation, which distinguishes between democracies of different quality (2008, p. 
37). 
The next section will examine if – and if yes, in what manner – these three views have 
influenced the definitional process in international law. 
Democracy in International Law: A Recent but Contested Concept 
Contrary to the long history of democracy theories in political science, the discussion on democracy in 
international law is a recent one. It was only after the Cold War that international law dared to address 
the issue of democracy which previously was considered to be a ‘domestic’ issue and thus one not 
subject to international scrutiny. Before the end of the Cold War, international law’s neutrality towards 
the legitimacy of regimes and the manner in which governments are formed was a principle firmly 
established in international law. Examples of this neutrality are plentiful (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America, 1986; Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1923; Moore, 1906, Oppenheim, 1905). The ‘shift in 
attitude’ is explained by the events of 1989–1991 – also referred to as the ‘Third Wave of 
Democratization’ – which led to the embrace of democracy in many countries, primarily in Eastern 
Europe (Franck, 1992; Huntington, 1993) 
While the discussion in political science focuses on the organization of a state and the exercise 
of power, the debate in international law primarily focuses on the ‘democratic entitlement’ or the 
‘right to democracy’. In particular, the debate on democracy has focused on three aspects: the 
democratic entitlement’s content, its sources or normative status and its consequences. The 
expressions ‘democratic entitlement’, ‘right to democracy’, ‘norm of democratic governance’, 
‘entitlement to a participatory electoral process’, ‘right to political participation’ and ‘electoral rights’ 
are used with relative interchangeability (Marks, 2000), adding significantly to the complexity of the 
debate. 
Contrary to political science, where democracy constitutes an essentially contested concept, 
the theoretical feasibility of defining democracy in a manner that is universally acceptable appears to 
be generally acknowledged in international law. In the practice of states, as exercised within the 
United Nations the issue is not questioned.
2
 To the contrary, within the United Nations framework 
democracy is defined as a universal value, which is said to mean two things: first, it is defined as a 
concept with an unchangeable core and second, the international community accepts that a democracy 
can take root anywhere. Furthermore, human rights bodies and scholars – when interpreting the phrase 
                                                 
2 Whether democracy can constitute a right on the other hand has been questioned. Commission on Human Rights, press 
release, U.N. Doc. HR/CN/99/61 (27 April 1999). 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ – have never questioned the feasibility of defining democracy in a 
manner than is acceptable to all (Garibaldi, 1984). Finally, in the writings of legal scholars on the 
democratic entitlement the issue barely has come up. The general focus of the debate on democracy is 
not on whether the concept can be defined in a universally acceptable manner, but on how it should be 
defined and on how the norm can be enforced (Franck 1993). It should however be acknowledged that 
a minority of legal scholars disagree as they consider democracy to be ‘the archetype of an essentially 
contested concept’ (Marks, (b) 1997). ‘As it means different things to different people’ they argue that 
‘any attempts to define the concept would be meaningless at best and imperialistic at worst’ (Ghai, 
1994).
 
Regardless of the fact that international law accepts the preposition that it is feasible to define 
democracy in a manner that is universal acceptable, at present there does not exist a consensus on such 
a universally accepted definition. However, similar to political science two main views can be 
discerned with regard to the democratic entitlement’s meaning, which will be discussed next. A view 
similar to the third view does appear to exist however it is considered to fall under the substantive 
view. 
With regard to the democratic entitlement’s content, two views can be discerned: a procedural 
and a substantive one. Proponents of the procedural view take free and fair elections to be the decisive 
criterion of democracy, although they recognize the extent to which the conduct of free and fair 
elections presupposes other human rights in particular the freedom of expression, the freedom of 
thought and the freedom of assembly and association (Marks, 2000). 
The theory of the democratic entitlement was first advanced in a seminal series of articles of 
which ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ written by the late Professor Thomas Franck 
is the most famous (Franck, 1992; Franck, 1994–1995; Franck, 1993). In that article, Franck argues 
that before the Cold War ended, a government could only be legitimized through the will of its 
population (Franck, 1993). However, he believes that due to the mentality change, generated by the 
end of the Cold War, the legitimacy of all governments will be determined in the future exclusively 
through international rules and procedures (Franck, 1992). He believes that the international 
community will only bestow legitimacy on democracies. Whether a state is democratic or not will be 
determined by reference to a global standard, the content of which will be defined by the international 
community (Franck, 1992). Franck argues that a consensus is emerging on the content of that global 
standard, i.e. the right to self-determination, the right to free and fair elections and the freedom of 
speech (Franck, 1992). In that article he thus appears to limit the meaning of the democratic 
entitlement to those three human rights. In a follow-on article, professor FRANCK elaborates further 
on the right’s content by defining it as ‘the right of people to participate, to be consulted, in the 
process by which political choices are made’ (Franck, 1993). While acknowledging that that some 
aspects of the right are already encompassed in existing human rights, he argues that the right to 
democracy ‘seeks to extend the protected ambit of rights to ensure meaningful participation by the 
governed in the political consultation process that shapes the quality of their lives and societies’ 
(Franck 1993). Key to the definition is the legitimacy of the process by which the rules are made and 
revised and not of any particular set of rules (Franck, 1993). For example, whether the people have a 
right to be consulted on a law or only as to the choice of lawmakers, is irrelevant to Franck as long as 
it is the people who choose, have a right to change, the terms on which they will participate (Franck, 
1993). With regard to its implementation, Thomas Franck argues that efforts to implement the 
democratic entitlement need to be ‘uncoupled, in the clearest fashion, from a long history of unilateral 
enforcement of a tainted, colonialist “civilizing” missions’; he thus urges that ‘all states 
unambiguously renounce the use of unilateral, or even regional, military force to compel compliance’ 
(Franck, 1992). 
Similarly, Gregory Fox, in his article The Right to Political Participation
3
 argues that 
international scholars have come to use the term democracy to mean the essential procedures by which 
a democratic society functions (Fox, 2000). In his mind, the distinctive essence of democratic 
government is popular sovereignty i.e. the notion of citizen consent to the exercise of coercive power 
with a state (Fox, 2000). While he sees merit in the argumentation set forward by democratic 
consequentialists who argue that a whole range of civil rights and social prerequisites may be 
necessary for meaningful popular consent, he points out that the fact of consent lies at the heart of their 
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theories. He observes that in the modern state, popular consent is made manifest through competitive 
elections. Consequently, international law’s modest approach to democratization therefore has focused 
on electoral processes. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that other political or social 
rights are not as essential to the process of democratization. Fox clarifies that he does not consider 
elections to be synonymous with democracy; they are a necessary first step (Ebersole, 1992) or an 
‘essential democratic minimum’ (Fox and Nolte, 2000). Elections are keystone rights as without them 
citizens are unlikely to secure other human rights (Ebersole, 1992). In later writings –co-authored with 
Georg Nolte – he elaborates further on what a more substantive definition of democracy might be, i.e. 
a conception of democracy by which citizens are enabled to enjoy certain essential rights, primary 
among them the right to vote for their leaders (Fox and Nolte, 2000).4 Fox and Nolte find support in 
customary international law for an account of democracy that tolerates only ‘the tolerant’ and is 
intolerant of anti-democratic actors. They consider restrictions on anti-democratic parties and 
individuals to be legitimate acts of self-protection. They thus find support for an account of democracy 
that rests on the liberal notion that government is legitimated not just procedurally but also to the 
extent that it fulfils its side of the social contract and protects’ rights (Marks, 2000). 
Other scholars tend to stress more the whole basket of human rights. James Crawford argues 
that the will of the people is the basis of the authority of government (Crawford, 2000).
 
He also argues 
that the major human rights treaties spell out the essentials of democracy. The democratic society as 
envisioned in the human rights treaties is one which respects the basic rights of its members. In his 
view, democracy implies a range of rights to participate in public life, effective freedom of speech, the 
opportunity to organize political parties and other groups and so on. Michael Byers and Simon 
Chesterman state that ‘the theory of the democratic entitlement argues in essence that the democratic 
entitlements spelt out in human rights treaties are at last achieving more than hortatory status’ (Byers 
and Chesterman, 2000). In the same article, they question how a ‘non-democratic regime even one 
established by a violent coup’ could itself constitute a threat to international peace and security (2000, 
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 The “substantive character” of this definition is questioned by Brad Roth: “Yet in thus purporting to take a 
“substantive view” of democracy, they commit themselves to very little substance, perhaps recognizing that a 
truly substantive view would transform the democratic entitlement into precisely the ideological battleground I 
fear. They instead slide back into proceduralism by positing as “primary” among citizens’ essential rights “the 
right to vote for their leasers […].” (Roth, 2000, (a)). 
p. 260). Christina Cerna links democracy to human rights and argues that ‘democracy or the right to 
live under a democratic form of government became an international legal right in 1948’ (Cerna, 
1994–1995). The international Bill of Human Rights incorporates, in her mind, the notion of a 
democratic state and human rights can only be protected under a democratic form of government. 
Evidence of a democratic government can be found in the presence of free and fair elections, an 
independent judiciary, freedom of political expression, equality before the law and due process (1994–
1995, p. 295). 
The procedural view is heavily criticized. Critique mainly focuses on the following three 
elements. First, it is stated that focusing on procedural elements does not take into account true 
popular will, as people could choose to elect a nondemocratic regime (Eckert, 1999). Proponents of 
the procedural view reply to this critique by stating that the right to free and fair elections and the right 
to self-determination cannot be exercised once and for all and thus a people has not a right to abolish 
the right to self-determination for future generations (Thornberry, 1993). Moreover, it is stated that a 
procedural view does not take into account the fact that elections alone are not sufficient to exercise 
genuine popular will. The exercise of genuine popular will requires the presence of certain conditions 
i.e. authoritative institutions to allow for knowing (based on good information), willing (not merely a 
choice among options imposed by the will of elites or circumstance) and intelligent (taken in 
circumstances that allow for proper reflection, including widely available education, a robust societal 
marketplace of ideas, and the absence of distortive economic pressures) collective choice. Whereas 
proponents of the procedural view would argue that an authoritarian regime can comply with the 
democratic entitlement if it organizes free and fair elections, proponents of the substantive view 
believe that an authoritarian regime can never satisfy the democratic entitlement given that it requires 
the presence of conditions requiring political transformation about which the populace was supposed 
to be empowered to choose (Fox and Roth, Introduction, 2000). 
A variety of other authors from a wide diversity of traditions point to other limitations of the 
procedural approach. They also put a stronger emphasis on the will of the people by stressing the ‘self’ 
in ‘self-government’ and focus less on the element of ‘legitimating of governance by others’ (Marks, 
1997, (b)). Civic republican theorists criticize the procedural approach as resigns itself to high levels 
of citizen passivity. They seek instead to develop proposals for enhancing direct participation by 
citizens in government. Theorists of civil society highlight that this notion of democracy presupposes 
weak structures of accountability in society (Beutz, 2003). They seek, instead to call attention to the 
importance of a vigorous and vigilant public sphere. Feminist theories highlight that this is way of 
understanding democracy predicates inequalities affecting the definition and exercise of the formal 
rights associated with citizenship (Otto, 1993).
 
They seek instead to redress those asymmetries through 
alternative approaches to the conceptualization and realization of equality (Marks, 1997, (b)). And 
theorists of globalization highlight that this account of democracy takes for granted the undemocratic 
character of international and transnational decision-making (Marks, 1997, (b)). They seek instead to 
consider how democratic principles might be applied to the expanding arena of non-national political 
activity (Slaughter, 2000). 
The second main point of criticism is that the democratic entitlement school attaches great 
normative value to democracy, as it is considered the sine qua non of governmental legitimacy (Fox 
and Roth, Introduction: 2000). They envision democracy as the sole political virtue. They, thus, 
disregard the element that what count as truly democratic are acts bringing about a democratic social 
reality. The latter insight inspiring supporters of the substantive view to eschew procedural elements 
when contrary to other political virtues. 
A third point of criticism is aimed the low standard a procedural approach imposes on states 
and its inability to attain any of the goals of democracy. Susan Marks, for instance states ‘If states 
have reached a certain minimum threshold they would become immune from further critique, which is 
an undesirable consequence, given the tendency in international relations to idealize democracy’ 
(Marks, 1997, (a)). Brad Roth adds that ‘by focusing on procedural elements, the broader issues 
involving the ends of democracy and the problematic role of polyarchy are glossed over’ (Roth, 2000, 
(b)). Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto argues that while formal mechanisms may constitute necessary 
components of a democratic society, they fall short of being sufficient in achieving the substance of 
democracy. Apart from referring to the concept ‘universal sufferance’ he does not elaborate on the 
substantive meaning of democracy (Maogoto, 2003). 
In order to remedy these concerns, Susan Marks defines democracy as ‘a general concept or 
ideal of self-rule on a footing of equality among citizens’ (Marks, 2000). Brad Roth proposes a 
teleological definition of democracy by identifying three normatively significant ends, by which 
progress towards democratization can be evaluated. These ends are: 
the furtherance of broad popular empowerment with respect to the full range of social 
decisions that condition life in the society (‘substantive democracy’); the 
establishment of a government to which the populace may in some manner be said to 
have manifested consent (‘popular sovereignty’); and the establishment of a broadly 
recognized basis for and thereby limitation on, the legitimate exercise of power 
(‘constitutionalism’). (Roth, 2000, (b)) 
Udombana defines democracy as ‘an ideology’ (Udombana, 2002–2003) ‘connected to thoughts about 
… aspirations, solidarity, virtue, faith, and the development of political identities in a civilized society’ 
(2002–2003, p. 1230). Democracy is a goal as well as a process, therefore there has to be continuous 
consultation, construction and reconstruction to meet changing needs and opinions (Udombana, 2002–
2003). He also refers to democracy as ‘the right of peoples to make choices about the quality of their 
lives’ (2002–2003, p. 1230). The implementation of such a ‘right’ requires other elements such as 
equal access to information, equality before law enforcement agencies, and fair distribution of 
resources (2002–2003, p. 1230). He distinguished democracy from the democratic entitlement. His 
definition of the democratic entitlement is taken from a working paper presented to the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
5
: 
the subjective capacity of individuals and peoples to demand of their rulers a political 
regime based on the rule of law and separation of powers, in which citizens can 
periodically elect their leaders and representatives in free and fair election, on the 
basis of the interaction between a number of political parties, full respect for the 
exercise of the freedoms of expression, the press, and association and the effective 
enjoyment of human rights. (2002–2003, pp. 1231–2) 
                                                 
5 Working Paper by Mr Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros on the Measures provided in the various international human rights 
instruments for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, in accordance with the mandate contained in decision 
2000/116 of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/32 
(2001), p.17, § 81 
Such substantive approaches to democracy are criticized for a variety of reasons. First, it is stated that 
substantive definitions are often over inclusive, meaning that they are too general to provide political 
guidance (Beutz, 2003). Moreover, they are not easily put into practice (2003, p. 401). Proponents of 
the procedural view justify their choice for elections as decisive element mainly on arguments of 
feasibility and workability. Franck for instance observes that his definition ‘represents the limit of 
what the still frail global system of states can be expected to accept’ (Ebersole, 1992). Fox echoes 
Schumpeter’s argument namely ‘that elections are something that international institutions can be very 
at monitoring and evaluating (1992, p. 270)’. Fox and Roth observe that the democratic entitlement 
school, by specifying the democratic entitlement without express reference to wider social goals, 
follows the contemporary comparative politics in literature in rejecting teleological definitions that 
render democratic performance inherently unmeasurable by social science techniques (Fox and Roth, 
Introduction, 2000). In addition, substantive conceptions are considered to be suspect of a neo-
colonialist strategy and they presuppose a consensus on what constitutes just or fair outcomes and thus 
to impose particular substantive visions where they are neither appropriate nor useful (Beutz, 2003). 
Democracy: Universal or Cultural Relative? 
At present, the universality of human rights does not appear to be contested anymore, at least in 
principle. In 1993, the international community confirmed that ‘all human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’.6 The Vienna Declaration further stated that 
the international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of 
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
While some argue that arguments of cultural relativism have disappeared totally, others take a more 
nuanced view by arguing that such concerns still persist, they have merely switched focus. Instead of 
questioning whether human rights are universal, proponents tend to concentrate now on the 
                                                 
6 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), OP. 
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consequences that the universal character of human rights brings about (Brems, 2009). A distinction 
can be made between the position of Asian and African nations on one side and Arab nations on the 
other hand. 
The main critique of Asian and African nations focuses on the Western emphasis on 
individual freedoms to the detriment of the community as a whole. They also challenge Western 
dominance in international affairs and claim a right to develop in a similar manner that Western 
nations have done so in the past. These concerns are generally translated into support for collective 
rights and the right to development, restrictions on individual rights in favour of the community and 
recognition of duties and responsibilities towards society in addition to rights and calls for an equitable 
international order. 
In Asia, the debate is known as the debate on ‘Asian Values’. China, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia are the thriving forces in this discussion. In the wake of the adoption of the Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action in 1993 a myriad of Asian nations adopted what is known as the 
‘Bangkok Declaration’ clearly outlining the concerns listed before. The most outstanding Asian values 
include the following: family, education, community, filial piety and loyalty, believe in thrift, 
indebtedness: obligation and duty to others, reciprocity and endurance (Zakaria, 1994; Hu, 2012). 
In Africa a clear statements on African values can be found in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (the ‘Banjul Declaration’) which refers to the ‘historical tradition and the values 
of African civilization’ which should ‘inspire and characterize’ African reflection on the concept of 
human and peoples’ rights.7 It recognizes on the one hand that fundamental human rights stem from 
the attitudes of human beings, which justifies their international protection, and on the other hand that 
the reality and respect of peoples’ rights should necessarily guarantee human rights. And it considers 
that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms ‘also implies the performance of duties on the part of 
everyone’. Unlike the American and European charters it stresses the right to development, and the 
duty of states, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of that right. The family is the 
custodian of ‘morals and traditional values recognized by the community’ but it is the duty of the state 
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to assist the family. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the state in their liberation 
struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural. And states shall also 
undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation, particularly that practised by 
international monopolies. 
Critique based on cultural relativist views expressed by Arab states differs from the arguments 
made by Asian and African states in the sense that it focuses on Islam, a cultural factor which is more 
dominant in Arab societies in comparison to the other cultural arguments made above. Various Arab 
nations have codified these concerns into an Arab Charter on Human Rights, the Preamble of which 
stressed the human relationship before God and the Arab Nations’ conviction that God honoured the 
Arab World by making it the ‘cradle of religions and civilizations’. It speaks of the pride in the Arab 
Nation’s long history and its major role in disseminating centres of learning between East and West. It 
upholds the eternal principles of fraternity, equality and tolerance among human beings which were 
‘consecrated by the noble Islamic religion and the other divinely-revealed religions’. Four phenomena 
in particular – racism, Zionism, occupation and foreign domination – posed a challenge to human 
dignity and constituted a fundamental obstacle to the realization of the basic rights of peoples (Article 
2 Arab Charter on Human Rights). The Charter seeks to achieve the entrenchment of the principle that 
all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated within the context of the 
national identity of the Arab States (Article 1 Arab Charter on Human Rights). Similar to the African 
system, the Arab Charter also speaks of ‘a balance between awareness of rights and respect for 
obligations’ and proclaims the family to be ‘the natural and fundamental group unit of society’ 
(Article 33 Arab Charter on Human Rights). It also proclaims a collective right to resist foreign 
occupation (Article 2 Arab Charter on Human Rights) 
Cultural relativist concerns based on Islam can be translated into the exclusion of certain 
groups of people from rights or rejecting the human rights body in total (Brems, 2009). The Arab 
Charter states for instance that ‘men and women are equal in respect of human dignity, rights and 
obligations within the framework of the positive discrimination established in favor of women by the 
Islamic Shariah, other divine laws and by applicable laws and legal instruments’ (Article 3 Arab 
Charter on Human Rights). 
The discussion on democracy’s universality has gone through a similar evolution. In the 
nineties, various nations openly questioned democracy’s relevance for non-Western nations. In an 
interview with Foreign Affairs in 1994, Singapore’s former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, stated that 
the United States should not ‘foist [its] system indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work’ 
(Zakaria, 1994). This quotation has been interpreted to imply that Western-style democracy does not 
apply to East Asia. Various Arab and African nations have also expressed similar concerns (Diamond 
and Platter, 2008; Shomar, 2005–2006). 
At present, democracy’s universality is not contested anymore, as the definition adopted by 
the United Nations illustrates.
8
 Within the United Nations states have further stated that The 
international community has recognized that democracy ‘does not belong to any country or region’ 
(G.A. Res 96 2000). The General Assembly and the former Commission on Human Rights have 
affirmed on various occasions that ‘while democracies share common features, there is no single 
model of democracy’ (G.A. Res 96 2000). This variety of models flows ‘from national and regional 
particularities, the various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, beliefs and traditions, and the 
diversity of economic, political, cultural, social and legal systems’ (G.A. Res. 154 2001) and that 
‘these differences should be neither feared nor repressed, but recognized, respected and cherished as a 
precious asset of humanity’ (C.HR. Res. 36 2001). ‘Each society and every context has its own 
indigenous and relevant democratic institutional traditions, and that while no single institution can 
claim democratic perfection, the combination of domestic democratic structures with universal 
democratic norms is a formidable tool in strengthening both the roots and the reach of democracy and 
in advancing a universal understanding of democracy’ (C.H.R. Res. 41 2001). Therefore, the former 
Commission on Human Rights ‘encouraged the development of broad-based democracy expertise 
drawn from all regions of the world’ (C.H.R. Res. 41 2001). 
The term ‘universal’ thus acknowledges first that democracy is a value belonging to all of 
humanity. Elements of the democratic spirit are traceable in the early thought of all major cultural 
traditions – African, Arab, Persian, Asian and European. The international community appears to 
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accept that democracy has evolved out of multiple sources and not solely out of European and 
American traditions. Second, the international community accepts that democracy can take root in any 
kind of society and as such it rejects claims that certain cultures are ‘peculiarly hostile to democracy’. 
Third, the international community accepts that the term democracy can be defined in a manner that is 
universally acceptable. However, it does not endorse any particular model as a universal blueprint of 
democracy but does accept that the absence of such a universal model does not negate universal 
democracy. 
The recognition of democracy as a universal value seems to suggest that concerns based on 
cultural relativism are no longer valid. This appears to be false. A similar argument as with regard to 
human rights can be made here i.e. the argument that the focus of the debate has shifted from 
questioning the universal desirability of democracy to questioning the universal application of the 
principle of democracy i.e. to the determination of the elements that are to be seen, by global 
consensus, as universal and which are to be regarded as particular expressions of democracy while 
remaining faithful to its universal elements (Brems, 2009; Ghai, 1994). 
Conclusion 
The Arab Spring and the Jasmine revolution raise many questions of both political and legal nature 
including questions regarding the manner in which the international community envisions democracy. 
This contribution started by sketching the theoretical framework on democracy and concluded that the 
two most dominant views both in legal and political scholarship are the substantive and the procedural 
approach. While at present none of the suggested and detailed definitions made under the substantive 
or procedural view is universally accepted, there does exist within the framework of the United 
Nations a definition of democracy. This definition, albeit very vague, appears to support the 
substantive view. It constitutes a minimalistic definition of democracy which applies equally to all 
regions. The argument that democracy is incompatible with certain cultures is not accepted anymore. 
The core norms listed in the definition should be considered invariant however they are subject to 
differing interpretations based on different cultures within the range laid down by these norms. This 
means that according this developing body of norms regarding democracy both the peoples of China 
and the Arab uprising, in the event that they are demanding democracy, call for at least the minimum 
set of norms as set out in the definition. 
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